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BRINGING DOWN THE DEAL: REEVALUATING THE DELAWARE 
MAE STANDARD AFTER AKORN V. FRESENIUS 
Katelyn E. Bryant* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For better or for worse, public corporations keep combining.1  
Successful mergers and acquisitions (M&A) brought us Whole Foods 
discounts with Amazon Prime and cross-posting to Facebook and 
Instagram.2  Through buying an airline ticket, renting a car, or grabbing 
a beer, most people have recently interacted with companies that came 
out ahead in an M&A transaction.3  While the combination process 
seems to happen quickly, signing a contract is far from the final step.  
Between executing an agreement and closing the deal, an enforceable 
contract binds the parties.4  Therefore, contracts must address any 
hazards that could threaten the target company before closing, 
commonly known as deal risk.5  Parties frequently mitigate deal risk 
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Rutgers University.  I would like to thank Professor Stephen J. Lubben for his invaluable 
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Hall Law Review staff for their editing assistance.  Finally, I would like to thank Nicholas 
D. Weisbrod for his feedback, insight, and support throughout the writing process. 
 1 See generally Parks & Recreation: The Johnny Karate Super Awesome Musical 
Explosion Show (NBC television broadcast Feb. 17, 2015) (announcing in a parody 
advertisement that a Verizon-ExxonMobil-Chipotle merger yielded “Veroxxotle,” “proud 
to be one of America’s 8 companies”).   
 2 Jeffrey Dorfman, Amazon and Whole Foods Merger to Introduce Cross-Platform 
Selling and Lower Prices, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffrey
dorfman/2017/08/25/amazon-and-whole-foods-merger-to-introduce-cross-platform-
selling-and-lower-prices/#7e4de4e312f8; Why Instagram Is Worth $1B to Facebook, 
FORTUNE (Apr. 10, 2012), https://fortune.com/2012/04/10/why-instagram-is-worth-
1b-to-facebook. 
 3 See, e.g., Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Corporate Consolidation (HBO 
television broadcast Sept. 24, 2017).   
 4 Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC Clauses 
in Business Combination  Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2015 (2009).  In public 
company combinations, this interim period can extend for a year or more.  Id.  Common 
sources of delay include due diligence, antitrust certifications, shareholder approvals, 
and regulatory inquiries.  Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral 
Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 335 (2005).   
 5 Miller, supra note 4, at 2013.   
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through bring-down conditions.6  In a standard bring-down condition, 
the seller first represents and warrants certain information that must 
be true at signing.7  The seller then brings down, or reaffirms, those 
representations and warranties when the buyer tenders the purchase 
price.8   
In so allocating deal risk,9 almost every10 merger agreement 
includes a material adverse effect (MAE)11 clause to give teeth to the 
bring-down conditions.12  If the seller cannot—or will not—rectify a 
failed bring-down condition, which failure would reasonably be 
expected to have an MAE, before any applicable cure period expires, the 
buyer can invoke the MAE clause and refuse to close.13  Until 2017, there 
was just one issue for parties who, like most,14 chose Delaware law: no 
court had ever excused a buyer’s closing obligations due to an MAE.15   
 
 6 Id. 
 7 Miller, supra note 4, at 2036. 
 8 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi, AG, No. 2018–0300–JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at 
*145 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (“[I]t is standard practice to . . . condition the buyer’s 
obligation to close on the seller’s representations also being true at closing.”), aff’d en 
banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018); LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS 
OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, § 1.05[4], at 1–41 (2018 ed.); cf. Cobalt 
Operating, LLC v. James Crystal Enters., No. 714-VCS, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, at *89 
(Del. Ch. Jul. 20, 2007) (“Due diligence is expensive and parties . . . often negotiate for 
contractual representations that minimize a buyer’s need to verify every minute aspect 
of a seller’s business.”).  
 9 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *113 n.530 (citing Miller, supra note 4, at 2013 
n.7). 
 10 E.g., Andrew Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine 
and the Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 818 (2010). 
 11 An alternate term, “material adverse change,” is essentially synonymous.  Akorn, 
2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *111 n.524 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724 
(Del. 2018); Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 331.  But see Kenneth A. Adams, A Legal-
Usage Analysis of “Material Adverse Change” Provisions, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 
10–11 (2004) (arguing that “material adverse change” affords greater clarity).  
 12 Jeffrey Manns & Robert Anderson, The Merger Agreement Myth, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 
1143, 1153 (2013). 
 13 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *145–46; KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, at 
§ 11.04[9]. 
 14 More public companies incorporate in Delaware than in any other state.  Faith 
Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate 
Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 59 (2018).  One possible explanation for this preference is that 
“Delaware’s preeminence in corporate matters makes its court the standard by which 
to judge all other such courts.”  Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of 
Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995).   
 15 Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 
2008); see also Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo (Mauritius) Holdings Pvt. Ltd., 
No. 8980-VCG, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 223, at *63–64 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2014) 
(acknowledging that an MAE may have occurred but ruling on alternate grounds). 
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This Comment will examine recent developments in Delaware MAE 
precedent and the potential ramifications from those developments.  
Part II will provide background information on MAE interpretation and 
review the three seminal Delaware decisions which shaped the accepted 
three-part MAE standard.  Part III will analyze how the Delaware MAE 
standard applied to the facts presented in Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi 
AG.16  Part IV will predict applications of the Akorn standard, focusing 
specifically on how the quantitative and qualitative findings made in 
that case may affect future MAE cases, alter the drafting process, and 
shift interpretation bias.  Part V will propose a new conduct/intent 
standard for qualitative MAE analysis and argue that future decisions 
should avoid biased interpretation.  Finally, Part VI will conclude that 
Delaware courts applying Akorn should specify a party-neutral 
qualitative MAE standard.  
II.  DELAWARE PRECEDENT AND THE SELLER-FRIENDLY POLICY   
Pre-2018 Delaware jurisprudence developed a three-part MAE test 
and set forth a seller-friendly policy perspective to guide judicial review.  
This Part briefly summarizes (A) background information that can 
influence MAE interpretation, (B) IBP,17 the seminal Delaware MAE 
case; (C) Frontier Oil,18 the second major MAE decision; (D) Hexion,19 the 
third pivotal opinion; and (E) the aggregate resulting MAE standard.  
A.  Interpretational Considerations  
The million-dollar question in any MAE case is what, exactly, 
constitutes an MAE.20  As discussed at length in Section V.B. below, 
narrow definitions rarely appear in contract language.  Instead, parties 
often agree to a vague materiality standard.  Courts faced with MAE 
claims must, therefore, decide whether parties meet that imprecise 
standard.  In other words, MAE opinions consider how material an 
adverse effect must be before the buyer can walk away from the deal.   
 
 16 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi, No. 2018–0300–JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018).  
 17 In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).  
 18 Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
29, 2005). 
 19 Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del. Ch. 
2008). 
 20 See Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *126 (“It would be neither original nor 
perceptive to observe that defining ‘Material Adverse Effect’ as a ‘material adverse 
effect’ is not especially helpful.”). 
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It is well established that material in this sense connotates a higher 
bar than the standard used in typical contract interpretation.21  The 
seminal Delaware MAE case adapted the federal securities regulation 
standard by considering whether an omitted fact would have influenced 
the decision-making process of a reasonable acquirer with the same 
total mix of information.22  Later cases specified that materiality “varies 
both with the context of the transaction and with the words chosen by 
the parties.”23  Whatever the exact standard may be, materiality is a 
question of fact.24  In making those factual findings, Delaware courts try 
to approximate what the parties intended when signing the 
agreement.25  The parties’ relative enthusiasm throughout the 
transaction typically receives scrutiny,26 and post hoc MAE declarations 
have produced consistently negative results for buyers.27  Put 
 
 21 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 878.  For example, factors toward determining 
material breach of contract include:  
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the 
benefit which he reasonably expected; (b) the extent to which the 
injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of that 
benefit of which he will be deprived; (c) the extent to which the party 
failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture; (d) the 
likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will 
cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any 
reasonable assurances; [and] (e) the extent to which the behavior of 
the party failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with 
standards of good faith and fair dealing. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).   
 22 IBP, 789 A.2d at 63 (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 23 Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *127; see Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo 
(Mauritius) Holdings Pvt. Ltd., No. 8980-VCG, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 223, at *63–64 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 31, 2014) (demonstrating how context and circumstances shape MAE 
definitions). 
 24 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *122; see Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1081 
(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Durning v. First Boston Corp. 815 F.2d 1265, 1268 (9th Cir. 
1987)) (“[O]nly if the adequacy of the disclosure or the materiality of the statement is 
‘so obvious that reasonable minds [could] not differ’ are these issues ‘appropriately 
resolved as a matter of law.’”).  But cf. Parnes v. Gateway 2000, 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that a misrepresentation is immaterial as a matter of law if it falls 
within common knowledge, concerns insignificant data, contains vague or hyperbolic 
language, or is accompanied by satisfactory cautionary statements). 
 25 See, e.g., Mrs. Fields Brand, Inc. v. Interbake Foods LLC, No. 12201-CB, 2017 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 113, at *58 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2017).  
 26 See id.  Courts frequently analyze informal statements, internal memos, meeting 
minutes, and party recollections when questioning initial enthusiasm.  See generally 
Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 724–30 (Del. Ch. 2008).  
This transactional timeline then considers when the buyer first suspected an MAE, the 
frequency with which the buyer mentioned an MAE, and when the MAE was finally 
claimed.  See generally id. 
 27 Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 356. 
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differently, the question becomes whether the buyer genuinely believes 
its own MAE claim, or whether it merely has buyer’s remorse. 
In answering that question, commentators have described MAE 
case law as inconsistent,28 counterintuitive,29 perplexing,30 incoherent,31 
and downright scary.32  Extensive factual findings produce behemoth 
opinions33 that frequently reach unpredictable conclusions.34  In pre-
Akorn Delaware jurisprudence, three lower court decisions formed a 
three-part MAE test that considers magnitude and duration35 through a 
seller-friendly policy lens.36 
B.  In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, Inc. 
The seminal Delaware MAE decision concerned a merger between 
buyer Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson) and seller IBP, Inc. (IBP).37  Tyson and 
IBP could barely contain their enthusiasm for the deal, and the kickoff 
meeting went off so well that Tyson’s CEO asked deal counsel to begin 
preparing an agreement right then and there.38  The merger agreement, 
which was governed by New York law,39 included bring-down 
conditions expressly warranting IBP’s financials40 and broadly 
 
 28 Yair Y. Galil, MAC Clauses in a Materially Adversely Changed Economy, 2002 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 846, 850 (2002).  
 29 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 825. 
 30 Galil, supra note 28, at 847.  
 31 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 825. 
 32 Symposium, Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 
219, 241 (2002) (statement of Richard Climan).   
 33 See Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi, AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (246 pages), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018); Hexion 
Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008) (130 pages); 
Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 
2005) (158 pages); In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. 
Ch. 2001) (190 pages).  
 34 Compare Raskin v. Birmingham Steel Corp., No. 11365, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 194, 
at *14–15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 1990) (50% decline in earnings over two consecutive quarters 
likely to constitute MAE) with IBP, 789 A.2d at 69 (64% decrease in quarterly earnings, 
not an MAE).  
 35 See Hexion, 965 A.2d 715 at 738.  
 36 IBP, 789 A.2d at 68. 
 37 Id. at 21.  
 38 Id. at 30.   
 39 Id. at 52. 
 40 Id. at 41–43.  IBP warranted that, as of the time of contract execution and through 
deal closing, all statements filed with the SEC on behalf of itself and its subsidiaries 
contained no untrue statements of material fact.  Id. at 42. 
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warranting against an MAE.41  Ten days after contract execution, Tyson 
advisors learned that IBP had received a letter from the SEC raising 
crucial issues with IBP’s prior year financial statements.42  Further, 
during the subsequent fiscal quarter, an unusually harsh winter 
financially impacted both Tyson and IBP, with IBP’s losses totaling 
roughly 64% of its standalone value.43  Tyson nevertheless expressed its 
continued commitment to the deal.44  But when Tyson’s enthusiasm 
waned, the deal essentially imploded.  Following a disappointing 
quarter of its own, Tyson decided not to proceed with the merger45 and 
unilaterally terminated the agreement.46  In resulting litigation, Tyson 
asserted that IBP’s failed bring-down conditions had caused an MAE and 
excused Tyson’s obligation to close.47   
From the start, the court viewed Tyson’s MAE claim suspiciously.  
Tyson had not even considered declaring an MAE before terminating the 
merger,48 and the court preliminarily concluded that Tyson would not 
have considered a short-term drop in IBP’s performance to be material 
when it signed the merger agreement.49  The court went on to consider 
MAE declarations conceptually, arriving at the oft-quoted conclusion 
that 
the important thing is whether the company has suffered a[n] 
[MAE] in its business or results of operations that is 
consequential to the company’s earnings power over a 
commercially reasonable period, which one would think 
would be measured in years rather than months. It is odd to 
think that a strategic buyer would view a short-term blip in 
earnings as material, so long as the target’s earnings-
 
 41 Id. at 42–43.  The bring-down condition stated that IBP had not suffered “any 
event, occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or facts which has had or 
reasonably could be expected to have a[n] [MAE].”  Id. 
 42 IBP, 789 A.2d at 43–44.   
 43 Id. at 47–48, 69. 
 44 Id. at 48.  
 45 Id. at 50.  The decision came down from a secretive March 28, 2001, meeting of 
former executives known as the “old guard,” including the CEO’s father.  Id.  Then-
present Tyson officials claimed that, prior to that meeting, they thought the deal was 
going forward.  Id. 
 46 Id. at 50–51.  The termination letter sent from Tyson to IBP contained no 
allegations of, or references to, IBP having suffered an MAE.  Id. at 51.  
 47 Id. at 52–53.  As previously mentioned, the merger agreement was governed by 
New York law.  Id. at 52.  Applying that choice of law, the court found that Tyson bore 
the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that IBP had sustained an MAE.  
Id. at 52–54. 
 48 IBP, 789 A.2d at 65. 
 49 Id. 
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generating potential is not materially affected by that blip or 
the blip’s cause.50 
The court further considered “the longer-term perspective of a 
reasonable acquiror” when determining what Tyson had understood 
the contract to mean.51  One abysmal quarter, the court reasoned, did 
not meet the materiality threshold because that disappointing quarter 
did not significantly inhibit IBP’s long-term earnings potential.52   
The decision also weighed a policy question: who should bear the 
burden of deal risk?53  The court reasoned that broad MAE definitions 
are “best read as a backstop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence 
of unknown events that substantially threaten the overall earnings 
potential of the target in a durationally significant manner.”54  Under 
that seller-friendly policy perspective, Tyson failed to prove that IBP 
had suffered an MAE.55  But this policy decision sparked debate among 
commentators who asked whether that interpretation reflected realistic 
expectations.56 
C.  Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp. 
Three years later, the court revisited IBP in Frontier Oil.57  This case 
concerned a long-anticipated58 consolidation of Frontier Oil 
Corporation (Frontier) and Holly Corporation (Holly).59  During 
negotiations, Frontier learned that its wholly-owned subsidiary faced 
possible mass tort litigation spearheaded by none other than Erin 
Brockovich.60  Accordingly, Holly insisted that stronger language, 
 
 50 Id. at 67. 
 51 Id. at 68. 
 52 Id. at 67 (characterizing IBP as “consistently profitable, but subject to strong 
[financial] swings”).  
 53 Id. at 68. 
 54 IBP, 789 A.2d at 68. 
 55 Id. at 71.  Then-Vice Chancellor Strine noted that the outcome would have been 
reversed if IBP had borne the burden of proving, to a clear and convincing standard, that 
an MAE had not occurred.  Id. at 72 n.172. 
 56 See Molly Brooks, The “Seller-friendly” Approach to MAC Clause Analysis Should Be 
Replaced by a “Reality-friendly” Approach, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 83, 84 (2010); see also 
Galil, supra note 28, at 865; Schwartz, supra note 10, at 831; Sherri L. Taub, Note, 
“Buyer’s Regret” No Longer: Drafting Effective MAC Clauses in a Post-IBP Environment, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. 849, 896–97 (2003).  
 57 Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *127 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 29, 2005). 
 58 The companies had informally discussed a consolidation for several years, with 
Frontier’s CEO predicting that the combination would create “one incredible company.”  
Id. at *3.   
 59 Id. at *2. 
 60 Id. at *7–8.   
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including a specific MAE bring-down condition,61 be added to the 
consolidation agreement.62  Shortly after contract execution, the 
threatened litigation materialized—with Frontier named as a direct 
defendant.63  Protracted restructuring efforts ultimately failed during a 
heated conference call with a seeming eye toward litigation.64  Frontier 
filed suit the next day, alleging that Holly had repudiated the 
agreement65 and effectively precluded Holly from declaring an MAE.66  
Holly vehemently denied any such repudiation and counterclaimed that, 
in breach of Frontier’s bring-down conditions, the mass tort litigation 
would reasonably be expected to have an MAE on Frontier.67   
The court first adopted IBP as the rule under Delaware law, 
describing the standard as affording protection from “unknown (or 
undisclosed) factors that would justify an exit from the transaction.”68  
The opinion acknowledged that future events could cause a present 
MAE69 but emphasized that there must be some “basis in law and fact 
for the serious adverse consequences prophesied by the party claiming 
the MAE.”70  That basis, the court held, must be supported by objective 
qualitative and quantitative evidence.71  In other words, Holly’s 
 
 61 Id. at *13–16. 
 62 Id.  The agreement defined an MAE, with respect to either party, as “a material 
adverse effect with respect to (A) the business, assets and liabilities (taken together), 
results of operations, condition (financial or otherwise) or prospects of a party and its 
Subsidiaries on a consolidated basis.”  Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 at *16 
(emphasis in original).  
 63 Id. at *38–40.  Newly discovered documents indicated that Frontier had indeed 
contracted to indemnify that subsidiary.  Id. at *45–46.  Frontier had not known about 
the indemnities before signing the agreement; upon discovery, it was less than 
forthcoming with the information.  Id. at *49. 
 64 Id. at *59.  Frontier’s CEO asked whether Holly was rescinding the contract, to 
which he “clearly, unambiguously, directly, and unequivocally responded[,] ‘No.’”  Id. at 
*81–82.  The court accepted Holly’s protest that Frontier’s CEO, a “straight-talking, boot-
wearing Texan who does not speak legalese[,]” would not have used such language 
independently.  Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 at *84.  Unfortunately, the opinion 
did not suggest what language that CEO would conceivably have used.   
 65 Id. at *86. 
 66 Id. at *105.  
 67 Id. at *89, *94–95.   
 68 Id. at *128–29.  The court conceded that Frontier may have breached the warranty 
against threatened litigation but emphasized that mere breach of warranty, absent a 
showing that such breach would reasonably be expected to have an MAE, did not sustain 
Holly’s claim.  Id. at *131. 
 69 Contra S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. DowBrands, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 657, 670 (D. 
Del. 2001) (“The sole decision by a third party to bring a lawsuit does not bring about 
any change in the company’s assets, unless and until a court adjudicates the claim in 
favor of the third party . . . .”).  
 70 Frontier Oil, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *137 n.224. 
 71 Id. at *142. 
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predictions could excuse its closing obligations if, but only if, Holly 
produced concrete facts suggesting that the mass tort litigation would 
end badly for Frontier.  Ultimately, Holly did not prove those facts and 
failed on its MAE claim.72  First, a finding for the mass tort plaintiffs was 
not guaranteed, and a judgment arising from any such finding was 
similarly unpredictable.73  Further, Holly presented no expert opinions 
supporting its prediction that Frontier would lose the mass tort 
litigation.74  Absent legal and factual evidence, the court found Holly’s 
MAE declaration overly speculative and without merit.75   
D.  Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp. 
This case concerned an acquisition of Huntsman Corporation 
(Huntsman) by Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. (Hexion).76  Hexion’s 
winning bid for Huntsman ousted a competitor with whom Huntsman 
had already contracted,77 so Huntsman enjoyed significant bargaining 
power.78  That advantage produced final terms so favorable to 
Huntsman that the MAE clause formed Hexion’s only practicable escape 
hatch.79  The parties also agreed to uncapped damages should Hexion 
knowingly or intentionally80 breach any contract term, and $325 million 
in liquidated damages for any other breach.81  In other words, if Hexion 
decided to jump ship, it would be on the hook for at least $325 million—
unless it could prove an MAE.  So, Hexion was in a tough spot when 
Huntsman’s first-quarter financial reports significantly missed 
 
 72 Id. at *136–37. 
 73 Id. at *136. 
 74 Id.  The court speculated that this lack of expert testimony was not surprising 
since “[i]t might not be in Holly’s self-interest, as a participant in the petroleum industry, 
to champion the cause of linking exposure to petroleum (or petroleum products) to 
cancer.”  Id. at *136 n.221. 
 75 Id. at *143.   
 76 Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del Ch. 2008).  
Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, Hexion’s parent company, began acquisition negotiations with 
Huntsman in late 2005.  Id. at 723.  After substantial due diligence, Apollo abandoned 
the 2005 negotiations when Huntsman missed income projections.  Id.  
 77 Id. at 724.  Hexion initially showed tremendous enthusiasm for the Huntsman 
deal.  Id. at 724–25. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. at 736–37.  That clause narrowly carved out exceptions for economic and 
industry conditions.  Id. 
 80 The court acknowledged that “knowingly” and “intentionally” are not terms 
typically used in contract law, but held that a “‘knowing and intentional’ breach . . . is the 
taking of a deliberate act, which act constitutes in and of itself a breach of the merger 
agreement, even if breaching was not the conscious object of the act.”  Id. at 747–48.   
 81 Id. at 724.  
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projections.82  Without notifying Huntsman, Hexion obtained and 
published an opinion stating that the combined company would be 
insolvent.83  Concurrently, Hexion filed suit for a declaratory judgment 
that Huntsman had suffered an MAE.84 
The Hexion court, relying on IBP and Frontier Oil, stressed the 
heavy burden assumed by buyers who cry MAE.85  The court held that 
the party seeking to avoid performance under an MAE claim bears the 
burden of proof86 and established the presumption that a buyer is 
purchasing a target company for long-term investment value.87  The 
court noted that while a severe decline in the target’s earnings may be 
an MAE, any such decline “must be expected to persist significantly into 
the future.”88  The evidence in this case showed that Huntsman’s 
financial decline affected only two divisions of the company, which had 
been expected to generate a mere 25% of Huntsman’s annual earnings 
before income tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA).89  
Moreover, the court looked critically at Hexion’s prepared insolvency 
opinion and found its credibility lacking.90  Yet again, apparent buyer’s 
remorse could not overcome the seller-friendly policy, and Hexion’s 
MAE claim met a familiar demise. 
E.  Aggregating the Pre-Akorn Standard 
Taken together, IBP, Frontier Oil, and Hexion solidified the 
Delaware MAE standard.  IBP established the seller-friendly policy91 and 
treated a broad MAE condition as a backstop such that the buyer gained 
protection from (i) unknown events (ii) which substantially threaten 
the target’s overall earnings potential (iii) in a durationally significant 
way.92  Frontier Oil posited that contemplated future effects with some 
basis in law and fact might constitute a present MAE.93  Finally, Hexion 
 
 82 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 725 n.8.  According to those reports, the 27% to 32% returns 
expected by Hexion had fallen to between 11% and 18%.  Id. 
 83 Id. at 725.  Although Hexion had no right to terminate the merger agreement for 
insolvency, it sought to frustrate financing and indirectly terminate the deal by 
publishing the insolvency opinion.  Id. at 725–26. 
 84 Id. at 736.  
 85 Id. at 738.  
 86 Id. at 739.  
 87 Id. at 738.  
 88 Hexion, 965 A.2d 715 at 738.   
 89 Id. at 744–45. 
 90 Id. at 727. 
 91 In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *137 n.224 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005). 
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established that the buyer presumptively bears the burden of proof94 
and that any negative financial projection relied upon to show an MAE 
must be reasonably expected to negatively affect the target’s long-term 
future performance.95  
As these cases demonstrate, the burden of disproving buyer’s 
remorse is so massive that “[a] contractual [MAE] is like a Delaware 
tornado—frequently alleged but rarely shown to exist.”96  This approach 
conforms with Delaware’s particular respect for contractarian theory97 
and sends a clear message: if a buyer wants an easier out, it should 
contract for one.  But commentators criticized Delaware’s uniformly 
seller-friendly record, finding that the standard deprived buyers of what 
was already in the contract: their bargained-for right to declare an 
MAE.98 
III.  CASE STUDY: AKORN, INC. V. FRESENIUS KABI AG 
Ten years after Hexion, one Delaware opinion did the unthinkable 
by finding a seller who had, indeed, suffered an MAE so severe that it 
excused the buyer’s closing obligations.99  This Part explores (A) the 
case’s factual background, including pre-signing conduct, specific bring-
down conditions, and post-signing developments; (B) the court’s 
findings that the seller had suffered an MAE under qualitative and 
quantitative thresholds; and (C) the opinion’s affirmation on appeal. 
 
 94 Hexion, 965 A.2d 715 at 739. 
 95 Id. at 742–43.  
 96 Chyronhego Corp. v. Wight, No. 2017-0548-SG, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 258, at *22 
(Del. Ch. July 31, 2018).  
 97 See Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, 
at *139 n.622 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (noting that Delaware law “is more contractarian 
than that of many other states”), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018); see also Ev3, 
Inc. v. Lesh, 103 A.3d 179, 181 n.3 (Del. 2014) (“Delaware courts seek to ensure freedom 
of contract and promote clarity in the law in order to facilitate commerce.”); Libeau v. 
Fox, 880 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. 2005) (“When parties have ordered their affairs 
voluntarily through a binding contract, Delaware law is strongly inclined to respect their 
agreement[.]”), rev’d on other grounds, 892 A.2d 1068 (Del. 2006); cf. Milford Power Co. 
v. PDC Milford Power, LLC, 866 A.2d 738, 748 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Many sophisticated 
parties . . . sign contracts that have terms that might be considered onerous; [Delaware] 
law does not relieve them of the burden of those decisions simply because of their after-
the-fact regrets.”). 
 98 Brooks, supra note 56, at 84; Schwartz, supra note 10, at 828. 
 99 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *193. 
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A.  Factual Background 
The court’s 246-page opinion incorporates extensive factual 
findings.100  This Section will address those findings in three parts: (1) 
the parties’ pre-signing conduct, (2) the terms of the agreement, and (3) 
subsequent events leading up to Fresenius’ MAE declaration.  
1.  Pre-Signing Conduct 
This case involved a failed pharmaceutical merger between buyer 
Fresenius Kabi AG (Fresenius) and seller Akorn, Inc. (Akorn).101  Akorn 
approached Fresenius in late 2016 to propose a merger.102  The parties 
entered into two confidentiality agreements in November 2016 under 
which Fresenius conducted due diligence.103  Fresenius made its initial 
bid shortly thereafter; Akorn turned down that bid and stated that 
Fresenius could not conduct full due diligence unless the company 
improved its bid.104  Following an improved bid in February 2017, 
Fresenius gained access to Akorn’s data room and conducted extensive 
due diligence regarding Akorn’s regulatory compliance records.105  
Based on that investigation, the Fresenius board approved an additional 
bid increase after receiving a management presentation that identified 
risk factors such as product launch delays and necessary capital 
expenditures; this presentation, however, identified no data integrity 
risks.106   
2.  Applicable Bring-Down Conditions 
The parties executed the final merger agreement on April 24, 
2017.107  That agreement defined an MAE in the traditional—though 
convoluted—terms as  
any effect, change, event or occurrence that, individually or in 
the aggregate (i) would prevent or materially delay, interfere 
with, impair or hinder the consummation of the [Merger] or 
the compliance by [Akorn] with its obligations under this 
 
 100 See id.  To prevent exceeding the opinion’s length, this Comment discusses only 
those facts relevant to the failed bring-down conditions. 
 101 Id. at *6–7.  Fresenius, a German corporation, and Akorn, a Louisiana corporation, 
chose Delaware law to govern the merger agreement.  Id. at *15 n.14. 
 102 Id. at *34–35. 
 103 Id. at *36.  
 104 Id. at *37–38.  The first confidentiality agreement addressed due diligence 
generally.  Id. at 36.  The second confidentiality agreement granted access to competitive 
information with possible antitrust implications.  Id.  
 105 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *40. 
 106 Id. at *42–43.  
 107 Id. at *43. 
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Agreement or (ii) has a material adverse effect on the 
business, results of operations or financial condition of the 
Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole . . . .108 
In the agreement’s bring-down conditions, Akorn represented that (i) it 
complied with all applicable FDA regulations; (ii) it complied with all 
contemporary good manufacturing practices; (iii) its tests and studies 
had all been conducted within that compliance status; (iv) it had made 
neither fraudulent statements nor false or misleading statements of 
material fact to the FDA; and (v) all drug proposals previously submitted 
for FDA approval had been accurate, complete, and correct.109  As is 
customary, Akorn warranted that each of those representations would 
remain true and correct through closing.110  Any deviation from Akorn’s 
as-represented conditions granted Fresenius the right to terminate the 
merger agreement if that deviation would reasonably be expected to 
constitute an MAE.111 
3.  Post-Signing Conduct 
Between October 2017 and January 2018, while awaiting antitrust 
approval, Fresenius received three whistleblower letters concerning 
Akorn’s compliance with FDA data integrity regulations.112  When 
Fresenius investigated those concerns, it learned that (i) the data 
integrity systems used in Akorn’s manufacturing process deviated 
significantly from FDA standards;113 (ii) Akorn’s data integrity systems 
contained numerous fundamental flaws that jeopardized its FDA 
compliance;114 (iii) these flaws permitted Akorn employees to enter 
noncompliant tests and studies;115 and (iv) prior drug proposals 
submitted for FDA approval had contained false, incomplete, and 
incorrect data sets.116  Fresenius also forwarded the whistleblower 
letters to authorities.117  When Akorn met with the FDA in March 2018 
to address the letters, company representatives made statements that 
Fresenius later alleged to have been misleading or knowingly false.118 
 
 108 Id. at *115 (first alteration in original). 
 109 Id. at *44. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *45. 
 112 Id. at *63, *71. 
 113 Id. at *153. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at *159–60.  
 116 Id. at *156–57. 
 117 See Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *78. 
 118 Id. at *87.  On receiving a copy of the meeting minutes, Fresenius’s deal counsel 
sent a strongly worded letter accusing Akorn of making “false, incomplete and 
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At a board meeting on April 17, 2018, Fresenius learned that the 
costs of remediating FDA noncompliance devalued Akorn’s equity by an 
estimated 37%.119  In response, Fresenius asserted that Akorn was in 
breach of its warranties and extended an opportunity for Akorn to 
respond or otherwise refute the claim;120 Akorn declined that offer.121  
Thereafter, Fresenius notified Akorn on April 22, 2018, that Fresenius 
was terminating the merger because, among other things, the failed 
bring-down conditions were reasonably likely to cause an MAE.122  
Akorn immediately filed suit, alleging that Fresenius wrongfully 
terminated the merger agreement.123   
B.  Holdings 
The court analyzed whether the “deviation between Akorn’s as-
represented condition and its actual condition was so great that it would 
reasonably be expected to result in a[n] [MAE].”124  Applying Frontier 
Oil, the court looked objectively at whether there was some basis in law 
and fact for Fresenius’s assertion.125  This Section considers how the 
court addressed (1) qualitative factors and (2) quantitative factors in 
reaching its conclusion.  
1.  Qualitative Factors 
Beginning with the qualitative factors, the court concluded that 
overwhelming evidence supported Fresenius’s MAE assertion.126  Data 
integrity violations concerning essential aspects of Akorn’s business 
existed in its systems at the time that Akorn made its representations.127  
Following the merger agreement, Akorn made no effort to remedy these 
failures, which increased in frequency and severity.128  That increase 
could be traced back to employee misconduct, including falsified FDA 
 
misleading” statements to the FDA, thereby violating the fifth warranty condition.  Id. at 
*88. 
 119 Id. at *89–90.   
 120 Id. at *90–91. 
 121 Id. at *91. 
 122 Id.  
 123 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *7. 
 124 Id. at *7.  Following Hexion, Fresenius bore the burden of proving that Akorn’s 
failed bring-down conditions would be reasonably likely to cause an MAE.  Id. at *145.  
The court first ruled that Fresenius had proven deviations from the as-represented 
condition.  Id. at *7. 
 125 Id. at *151. 
 126 Id.  
 127 Id. at *153. 
 128 Id. at *152, *154. 
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submissions and management oversight neglect.129  Fresenius 
supported these assertions with credible expert testimony, which the 
court accepted as suggesting a qualitative MAE from Akorn’s failed 
bring-down condition.130 
The court also weighed Akorn’s dramatic shift in claimed 
regulatory compliance.131  In May 2018, the FDA began an investigation 
into Akorn’s facilities to evaluate the nature and severity of the 
whistleblower accusations.132  During the late-stage FDA investigation,  
someone at Akorn erased a product-specific electronic database, 
together with its local backup file and related security logs, ostensibly 
to conceal further damaging data from the FDA.133  Because Akorn’s 
products required consistent, accurate, and reliable data, the court 
found that these systemic failures called into question the reliability of 
all company data; those questions meant that Akorn could not operate 
at all until it remedied the data integrity issues.134  The court concluded 
that this necessary suspension in operations, brought about by “a 
disastrous culture of noncompliance[,]” constituted an essential failure 
of Akorn’s MAE bring-down condition.135   
2.  Quantitative Factors  
Turning to the quantitative elements, the court weighed the 
projected remediation costs and the resulting impact on deal value, and 
whether that impact would have been considered material by the 
parties at contract execution.136  The parties’ respective experts 
presented starkly conflicting projections as to remediation costs,137 but 
the court rejected both estimates, determining that the actual 
remediation cost probably fell somewhere between those figures.138  
Taken alongside the deal price, the court’s accepted remediation costs 
 
 129 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *155–57. 
 130 Id. at *159–61. 
 131 See id. at *165. 
 132 Id. at *94–95. 
 133 Id. at *164–65.  
 134 See id. at *165. 
 135 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *165–66. 
 136 Id. at *165–66. 
 137 Id. at *166.  Fresenius anticipated that the regulatory violations were significantly 
more severe than had been detected in due diligence and, therefore, projected a 
remediation cost which represented the worst-case scenario.  Id. at *168–71.  By 
contrast, Akorn’s expert predicted that no further compliance issues would be detected 
on subsequent audits and estimated remediation expenses for only those violations 
identified during due diligence.  Id. at *166–68. 
 138 Id. at *172. 
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devalued the transaction by 21% of Akorn’s total equity value.139  
Problematically, the record contained no evidence concerning the 
parties’ subjective expectations or industry standards to indicate 
whether a 20% decrease in equity value would be material.140   
Relying on his intuition, the Vice Chancellor ultimately determined 
that a 20% decrease in overall value met the quantitative materiality 
threshold.141  In cross-checking this intuition, the Vice Chancellor 
considered four indicators suggesting that a 20% loss in total value 
would be considered material to a reasonable acquiror.142  First, a 20% 
drop in stock prices creates a bear market.143  Second, in renegotiations, 
after one party declares an MAE, the average buyer demands a 15% 
reduction from the original deal price.144  Third, in stock consideration 
deals, parties generally set upper and lower collar bounds between 10% 
and 20%.145  Finally, reverse termination fees146 average at about 6% of 
the total transaction value.147  For those reasons, the court found that 
the quantitative factors supported Fresenius’s MAE assertions and, 
 
 139 Id.  
 140 Id. at *172–73.  
 141 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *173. 
 142 Id. at *174. 
 143 Id.  That the public recognizes a term for that specific threshold, the court 
reasoned, indicates a broad cultural acceptance that this decrease is material.  Id. at 
*175. 
 144 Id. at *175.  This average price reduction suggested that a 20% decrease in the 
target company’s total equity value would be material to a reasonable buyer.  Id. 
 145 Id. at *175–76.  The court found that even those these numbers represent a noisy 
proxy, which is usually accompanied by an additional MAE clause, the fact that parties 
generally renegotiate after a 10% loss indicates that parties would find a 20% loss 
material.  Id. at *177.  For a discussion of collars as a renegotiation tactic, see Micah S. 
Officer, Collars and Renegotiation in Mergers and Acquisitions, 59 J. FIN. 2719 (Dec. 2004).  
 146 Reverse termination fees, another buyer protection term commonly included in 
merger agreements, become payable by the buyer to the seller following a merger 
agreement termination caused by specific triggering events such as regulatory/antitrust 
approval, financing contingencies, and representation and warranty conditions.  Bryan 
JM Quinn, Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 809, 812 (2010).  For 
a comparison study between reverse termination fees and MAE clauses, see Gilson & 
Schwartz, supra note 4. 
 147 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *177–78 (citing Matthew D. Cain et al., Broken 
Promises: The Role of Reputation in Private Equity Contracting, 40 J. CORP. L. 565, 593–94 
(2015)).  Noting that reverse termination fees mark another noisy proxy and that 
reverse termination fees essentially establish an option, the court nonetheless found 
that a 20% loss in value, which far exceeds the average 6% reverse termination fee, 
would likely be material to a reasonable buyer.  Id.  
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together with the qualitative factors, excused Fresenius’s closing 
obligations.148 
C.  Appeal 
Chief Justice Strine, writing for a unanimous Delaware Supreme 
Court, affirmed the lower court in a three-page opinion.149  Commending 
the Court of Chancery for its extensive fact findings and well-supported 
conclusions, the Supreme Court found “no need . . . to comment upon or 
to address [that] reasoning”150 and accepted that Akorn had suffered an 
MAE so severe that Fresenius no longer bore its closing obligations.151 
IV.  THE POST-AKORN DELAWARE MAE STANDARD 
This Part considers the complications that Akorn may impose on 
Delaware MAE jurisprudence, namely (A) the qualitative and 
quantitative thresholds applied, (B) changes to the drafting process 
caused by the framework provided, and (C) the shifting interpretation 
bias. 
A.  Qualitative and Quantitative Thresholds 
Akorn’s percentage quasi-threshold152 for quantitative significance 
marks the only numeric data point at which Delaware courts have found 
an MAE, but the opinion’s analysis of non-numeric qualitative factors 
affords significantly less guidance.  Given the formulaic standard,153 it is 
not hard to imagine how the Akorn standard might fall too far from the 




 148 Id. at *166, *178.  The court posited in a footnote that the findings were case-
specific and that the percentages should not be interpreted as a bright-line rule.  Id. at 
*173 n.740. 
 149 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018) (en banc).   
 150 Id. at 724 n.5.  Notably, Chief Justice Strine decided IBP and implemented the 
seller-friendly policy perspective while sitting as a Vice Chancellor.  In re IBP, Inc. 
S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 68 (Del. Ch. 2001).   
 151 Akorn, 198 A.3d 724, 724 n.5 (Del. 2018) (en banc). 
 152 Richard W. Slack & Joshua M. Glasser, The Material Adverse Effect Landscape after 
Akorn v. Fresenius, 15 PRATT’S J. OF BANKR. L. 29, 39 (Jan. 2019). 
 153 See KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, at § 11.09 (“[T]he Akorn opinion provides a clear 
methodology for evaluating the magnitude of a given effect and an approach for 
assessing its durational significance.”). 
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1.  The Quantitative Quasi-Bright-Line Rule 
The decision’s reliance on a 40% materiality benchmark supports 
the assertion that any decline exceeding that level will be deemed 
material;154 this approach has since found support in subsequent 
decisions.155  Moreover, notwithstanding the opinion’s footnote 
admonishment,156 it is likely that parties will now evaluate MAE claims 
against the decision’s percentage benchmark because Akorn’s 20% 
decrease in equity value represents the only data point in Delaware MAE 
jurisprudence.157  Such reliance may well prove problematic because, as 
the opinion acknowledges,158 each of the four justifications for that 
threshold oversimplifies materiality.  
The decision first justifies the 20% materiality threshold by 
comparison with how the public perceives bear markets.159  Of the four 
comparisons considered in the decision, this corollary comes closest to 
reflecting the party intent analysis emphasized in other decisions.  
Applying broad cultural understanding, however, clashes with the 
inherently fact-specific nature of an MAE.  Moreover, this analogy does 
not account for the positional differences between strategic buyers and 
short-term investors.160  A one-quarter earnings decline—like one that 
may occur during a bear market—might well be material to a short-term 
investor;161 that same one-quarter earnings decline is less likely to be 
material to a strategic buyer seeking long-term earnings potential.162  
Because the bear market analogy groups those two types of buyers 
 
 154 Id. (“[M]ost cases that have considered decreases in profits in the 40% or higher 
range found a [MAE] to have occurred.”).  
 155 Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2018-0673-AGB, 2019 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 1394, at *86 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019). 
 156 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at 
*173 n.740 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018). 
 157 Slack & Glasser, supra note 152, at 39 (“Future cases will likely test whether an 
over-20% valuation hit automatically counts as qualitatively significant . . . .”); see Adam 
O. Emmerich & Trevor S. Norwitz, The MAC Is Back: Material Adverse Change Provisions 
after Akorn, THE INT’L COMP. LEGAL GUIDE TO: MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS (2019), at 5 (“A 20% 
decrease in the value of the seller may constitute a MAC.”).  
 158 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *178 (“I do not pretend that any of these 
indicators is directly on point.”).  
 159 Id. at *174. 
 160 See In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 67–68 (Del. Ch. 
2001) (distinguishing what would be material to a strategic buyer from what would be 
material to a speculative investor).   
 161 Id. at 67. 
 162 Id.   
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together, it deviates from the well-established nuance underlying MAE 
declarations.163  
Other data points provided in the opinion adhere more closely to 
the accepted materiality principles but may ultimately set the threshold 
even lower than 20%.  Where a decline in equity value reaches only 
15%, for example, the buyer may now argue that this drop represents 
what the parties might have agreed upon in subsequent renegotiations.  
And in stock-for-stock deals, parties who do not bargain for collars may 
nonetheless invoke the decision’s materiality justification for a 10% 
decline in value—which would typically trigger a significant price 
change164—to demonstrate why a similar decline constitutes an MAE.  
The discussion of reverse termination fees provides an even lower data 
point, reasoning that a decline in value of more than 6% would cause 
the buyer to consider paying the reverse termination fee to avoid more 
significant long-term losses.165  These data points suggest, troublingly, 
that a particular numeric value may apply even where parties fail to set 
a deal-specific threshold.  
At least one subsequent opinion has reinforced that there is no 
sanctioned bright-line rule for what constitutes a quantitative MAE.166  
That opinion, however, also weighed the facts presented against the 
20% materiality benchmark used in Akorn.167  This treatment suggests 
that, given credible supporting evidence, Delaware courts may be 
willing to follow the Akorn materiality benchmark.168  But it remains to 
be seen whether the 20% threshold will create false positives169—or 
 
 163 Subsequent opinions have further consolidated those positions into a “reasonable 
investor/acquiror” label.  See Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2018-
0673-AGB, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394, at *54 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019).   
 164 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *175–76.   
 165 Id. at *177–78.   
 166 Channel, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394, at *86. 
 167 Id.  
 168 See Glenn West et al., Just Because a Really Bad Thing Happens Does Not Mean a 
Material Adverse Effect Has Occurred: Assessing the Latest Delaware MAE Decision, WEIL, 
GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP (Dec. 24, 2019) https://www.weil.com/~/media/mailings/
2019/q1/channel-medsystems_clean-revision-4.pdf (“The Chancellor’s highlighting of 
these benchmarks suggests that parties . . . consider whether they can demonstrate a 
decline of at least 20% before asserting [an] MAE.”) (emphasis in original).  
 169 See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case 
of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 889 (2010) (defining false positives as 
“circumstances in which the proxy condition is violated, but the parties would not intend 
to excuse the buyer”).  
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false negatives170—where parties assert that a decrease in equity value 
is sufficiently material.171   
2.  The Qualitative Threshold 
An additional complication to the quasi-threshold is that the MAE 
test for failed bring-down conditions balances quantitative factors 
against qualitative factors.172  While the Akorn decision provides 
significant guidance toward quantification,173 the qualitative materiality 
analysis affords much less clarity.   
The qualitative analysis may turn on whether the buyer has 
presented overwhelming evidence showing an essential failure in the 
target business.174  Qualifying the failure as essential suggests that, 
absent evidence meeting the numeric thresholds, the target business 
must have sustained such extreme damage that the transaction’s 
principal purpose has been irreparably frustrated.175  An essential 
failure standard would, therefore, expand upon the common law 
doctrine of frustration of purpose.176  Alternatively, the qualitative test 
may examine the context to determine whether the purposes of the 
contract have been, or are reasonably likely to be, materially impaired.  
Systemic effects that would likely continue, worsen, or spread across the 
target business might certainly impair a company such that the 
transaction is materially frustrated.  In that sense, qualitative 
considerations seemingly include primary as well as secondary 
purposes, and whether those purposes will collide because of the 
adverse effect.177  Until future decisions shed light on the qualitative 
treatment applied in Akorn, this element remains an unclear aspect of 
the MAE framework.  
 
 170 See id. (defining false negatives as “circumstances in which the condition is not 
violated, but the parties would want to excuse the buyer in order to achieve the 
contracting goals of efficient investment or signaling”).  
 171 See Slack & Glasser, supra note 152, at 39; West et al., supra note 168, at 2. 
 172 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *150–51 (Del. Ch. Oct. 
1, 2018) (quoting Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *36 n.224 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005)), aff’d en banc, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018). 
 173 See KLING & NUGENT, supra note 8, at § 11.09. 
 174 Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *151–52.  
 175 See Genesco, Inc. v. Finish Line, No. 07-2137-II(III), 2007 Tenn. Ch. LEXIS 1, at 
*53–55 (Tenn. Ch. Dec. 27, 2007); Pine State Creamery Co. v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc., 
No. 98-2441, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 31529, at *16 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 1999) (per curiam); see 
also Schwartz, supra note 10, at 830–31.  
 176 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 830–31. 
 177 See Genesco, 2007 Tenn. Ch. LEXIS 1, at *16–19 (contextualizing primary and 
secondary failures to find an MAE). 
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B.  Drafting Changes 
Combination agreements require extensive artisanal drafting to 
reflect the unique facts and circumstances surrounding each 
transaction.178  That significant customization leaves many agreement 
terms, including bring-down conditions, open for negotiation.179  
Moreover, the high stakes place MAE conditions among the most heavily 
negotiated merger terms.180  Targets prefer narrow language with fewer 
exceptions to the buyer’s closing obligations,181 whereas buyers prefer 
broad language, which affords more flexibility to walk away.182  Because 
parties can rarely agree to precise terms, merger agreements typically 
include vague language and do not define what would be considered 
material to the transaction.183  This drafting technique limits the risk of 
potentially overbroad or underinclusive language.184  Deliberately 
vague terms also reduce drafting costs which would otherwise be 
incurred by attempting to foresee all possible scenarios.185  But 
intentional ambiguity effectively delegates interpretation to courts 
should the transaction go south.186  The associated juridical risk187 can 
dilute these strategic decisions because MAE interpretations 
notoriously defy consistency.188 
 
 178 Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, Boiling Down Boilerplate in M&A Agreements: A 
Response to Choi, Gulati & Scott, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 219, 226 (Jan. 2019) (finding that 
“over half of the text of merger agreements is routinely rewritten from one deal to the 
next”).   
 179 Brooks, supra note 56, at 86.  
 180 Choi & Triantis, supra note 169, at 853; Miller, supra note 4, at 2012.  
 181 Schwartz, supra note 10, at 822. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Choi & Triantis, supra note 169, at 883; see Symposium, Negotiating Acquisitions 
of Public Companies, supra note 32, at 243 (comment of Joel Greenberg) (describing how 
overly specific terms might “totally put the nail in the coffin for any event [the parties] 
didn’t list”).   
 184 Inclusivity is particularly problematic in M&A transactions, where information 
asymmetry often becomes apparent only after due diligence.  Choi & Triantis, supra 
note 169, at 855. 
 185 John F. Coyle & W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Interpreting Contracts Without Context, 
67 AM. U. L. REV. 1673, 1677 (2018); see Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 357 (“[I]t 
would be too costly for parties to create behavioral codes that courts could merely 
enforce.”).  But see Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms 
Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 205–06 (2009) (arguing that 
ambiguous contract language does not reduce drafting costs but seeks to prevent either 
side from misinterpreting the terms).  
 186 David Cheng, Interpretation of Material Adverse Change Clauses in an Adverse 
Economy, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 564, 574 (2009). 
 187 Juridical risk is the possibility that specific clauses or terms may be 
inappropriately included or excluded in the course of litigation.  Gilson & Schwartz, 
supra note 4, at 354. 
 188 Id.; see also Choi & Triantis, supra note 169, at 854. 
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By expressly rejecting the frustration of purpose approach to MAE 
interpretation,189 the Akorn opinion confirmed that MAE clauses do have 
an independent meaning after all.190  Problematically, that meaning may 
not be what parties subjectively intended.  The juridical risk created by 
Akorn will promote narrow drafting language as parties attempt to 
contract around common law materiality thresholds.191  By carving out 
narrow exceptions, parties can address known risks and clearly 
articulate specific intent.192  But interpreting narrow drafting 
necessarily assumes that even where risks are unforeseen—or 
undisclosed—the parties have some specific intent to articulate.193  At 
the time of contract execution, parties might not have a specific, 
subjective intent regarding whether a particular event or circumstance 
would or would not be material.194  In those scenarios, tightly drafted 
language designed to reflect the parties’ clear understanding can trigger 






 189 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at 
*132 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (quoting Schwartz, supra note 10, at 807) (“‘In lieu of the 
default rule that performance may be excused only where a contract’s principal purpose 
is completely or nearly completely frustrated, a contract could lower this bar to an 
achievable level by providing for excuse when the value of counter-performance has 
“materially” . . . diminished.’ That is what the parties did in this case.”), aff’d en banc, 198 
A.3d 724 (Del. 2018). 
 190 See Emmerich & Norwitz, supra note 157, at 8.  
 191 West et al., supra note 168, at 2; see Leslie J. Levinson & Anna Jinhua Wang, The 
Akorn Case – New Development in Delaware for Termination by Material Adverse Effect, 
THE NAT’L L. REV., Feb. 6, 2019, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/akorn-case-
new-development-delaware-termination-material-adverse-effect (“From a drafting 
perspective, if a particular MAE the contracting parties contemplate could be quantified, 
the parties should consider setting a specific metric to the definition of such MAE.”). 
 192 Levinson & Wang, supra note 191.  For specific scenarios where a known 
condition threatens the deal’s vitality before contract execution, buyers may prefer 
narrow language that predetermines the impact that the condition will have on each 
party.  During the 2020 global coronavirus disease pandemic, for example, some public 
company merger agreements explicitly addressed the parties’ respective performance 
expectations.  See, e.g., Grace Maral Burnett et al., Analysis: Morgan Stanley, E*Trade 
Merger Excludes Coronavirus, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 28, 2020, https://news.bloomberg
law.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-morgan-stanley-e-trade-merger-excludes-
coronavirus (highlighting language which excludes any “epidemic, pandemic or disease 
outbreak (including the COVID-19 virus)” from qualifying as an MAE).  
 193 See Brooks, supra note 56, at 101. 
 194 Hill, supra note 185, at 216.  
 195 See Brooks, supra note 56, at 101. 
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Interpretation risk further increases given the inherently fact-
specific nature of MAE circumstances, where predetermined criteria 
often prove arbitrary.196  Requiring parties to anticipate and address 
every possible deal risk would impracticably complicate the negotiation 
and drafting process.197  Moreover, because specific language 
necessarily excludes broad meaning,198 narrow terms limit 
extracontractual evidence, which could otherwise illuminate how the 
parties would have addressed the eventual circumstances.  
C.  Interpretation Bias 
Akorn sets a heavy burden for sellers, who must now make a strong 
showing following a 20% projected loss.199  Where the anticipated 
decline in equity value exceeds 20%, sellers will need to bring strong 
evidence showing subjective expectations under the agreement and 
why those expectations are not consistent with finding the current loss 
material.200  Even where the anticipated loss does not meet the 20% 
quasi-presumption, sellers will have to analogize away from 
renegotiation price adjustment rates, collars, and reverse termination 
fees, each of which sets a lower data point than the 20% decline found 
in the Akorn opinion.201   
And for all that Akorn giveth, it taketh very little away.  Despite any 
contrary appearances, Delaware courts did not expressly swear off the 
IBP seller-friendly policy perspective.  Until further opinions address 
that issue, it is difficult to determine whether the Akorn deviation will 
remain confined to the facts presented.202  Further, the decision did not 
 
 196 See Michelle Shenker Garrett, Efficiency and Certainty in Uncertain Times: The 
Material Adverse Change Clause Revisited, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBLEMS 333, 359 (Spring 
2010).  
 197 In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 789 A.2d 14, 144 (Del. Ch. 2001) 
(positing that narrow judicial interpretation would “encourage the negotiation of 
extremely detailed ‘MAC’ clauses with numerous carve-outs or qualifiers”).   
 198 See Schwartz, supra note 10, at 829. 
 199 West et al., supra note 168, at 2. 
 200 Slack & Glasser, supra note 152, at 39 (suggesting that sellers projecting a 
valuation loss greater than 20% “will have to explain why they believe that [Akorn]’s 
quasi-bright-line . . . is off”). 
 201 See id.  
 202 The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a flood of MAE litigation that asked Delaware 
courts to decide whether the pandemic constituted an MAE.  For a consolidated list of 
such cases, see CHANCERY BLOG, Delaware Corporate Litigation in the Time of Coronavirus, 
http://chanceryblog.com/court-procedure/ (last visited June 17, 2020).  As of the date 
of this Comment, Delaware courts have not decided this issue but seem to acknowledge 
that the circumstances may qualify.  For example, in a telephonic hearing for one COVID-
19 MAE case, the Chancery Court withheld a ruling due to “the sheer breadth and 
complexity of the legal issues” necessarily raised by MAE claims.  Telephonic Rulings of 
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negate the heavy burden faced by buyers who seek to avoid 
performance by invoking an MAE.  By deviating from the IBP “backstop” 
approach,203 however, Akorn creates an opportunity to revisit the 
Delaware MAE approach.  
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN UPDATED MAE STANDARD 
Delaware courts should adopt a new MAE standard by (A) 
clarifying the qualitative analysis set by the Akorn opinion and (B) 
eliminating presumptive advantages.  This Part argues that courts 
should avoid restating common law default rules and adopt a three-part 
conduct/intent standard, as well as an unbiased interpretation policy, 
to reflect bargained-for contractual rights. 
A.  Clarify the Qualitative Analysis 
When applying Akorn, Delaware courts should specify a standard 
of qualitative review for when a failed bring-down condition constitutes 
an MAE.  This Section considers two conflicting standards: (1) an 
essential failure standard and (2) a conduct/intent standard. 
1.  The Essential Failure Standard 
Discussing how Akorn’s data integrity violations represented an 
essential failure to its business operations, and how overwhelming 
evidence supported Fresenius’s claim, raises a useful starting point for 
a new qualitative MAE test.  Delaware courts could use a context-specific 
approach that analyzes all relevant circumstances to determine what 
constitutes an essential failure.  And in defining overwhelming evidence, 
Delaware courts could specify the heavy burden framework outlined in 
prior decisions as one which requires objective and subjective proof 
that the essential failure is reasonably likely to result in an MAE.204  That 
high evidentiary standard could help to weed out claims motivated by 
buyer’s remorse.  And while long-term goals would remain the 
paramount indication of party intent, the buyer could demonstrate how 
the failed bring-down condition had been essential to a short-term goal 
or secondary purpose sought through the transaction.  
 
the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Expedite at 15–22, Juweel Inv’rs Ltd. v. Carlyle 
Roundtrip, L.P., C.A. No. 2020-0338-JRS (Del. Ch. May 20, 2020).  As of the date of this 
Comment, Delaware courts have yet to posit whether the COVID-19 pandemic may 
circumstantially constitute an MAE.  See Verified Complaint at 4, Tiffany & Co. v. LVMH 
Moët Hennessy-Louis Vuitton SE, et al., C.A. No. 2020-0768-JRS (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 2020).  
 203 See Slack & Glasser, supra note 152, at 9. 
 204 For a similar MAE approach, see Genesco, Inc. v. Finish Line, No. 07-2137-II(III), 
2007 Tenn. Ch. LEXIS 1 (Tenn. Ch. Dec. 27, 2007). 
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The dilemma with an essential failure MAE standard is that it 
effectively restates the “basic assumption” standard set forth in 
common law default rules.205  As the Akorn opinion points out, “[i]t is not 
reasonable to conclude that sophisticated parties to merger agreements, 
who expend considerable resources drafting and negotiating [MAE] 
clauses, intend them to do nothing more than restate the default rule.”206  
If parties intend to excuse performance only on the occurrence of an 
essential failure, those parties could invoke impracticability207 or 
frustration of purpose208 rather than relying on a contractual provision.  
Moreover, the burden of producing overwhelming evidence to support 
an MAE assertion would turn the buyer’s already heavy burden into a 
Sisyphean undertaking, virtually negating bargaining power for MAE 
terms.  Where parties meticulously negotiate an MAE clause, applying a 
common law default rule fills a nonexistent gap in contravention to 
established contract law.209   
 
 205 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Where . . . a 
party’s performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an 
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was 
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the 
circumstances indicate the contrary.”) (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Where . . . a party’s principal purpose is 
substantially frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his 
remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the 
circumstances indicate the contrary.”) (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 266(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Where, at the time a contract is made, a party’s 
principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by a fact of which he has 
no reason to know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the 
contract is made, no duty of that party to render performance arises . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
 206 Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at 
*132 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (quoting Schwartz, supra note 10, at 828), aff’d en banc, 198 
A.3d 724 (Del. 2018). 
 207 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
 208 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 209 See 3M Co. v. Neology, Inc., No.: N18C-07-089 AML CCLD, 2019 Del. Super. LEXIS 
312, at *29–30 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2019) (rejecting allegations of breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing where the MAE clause addressed the conflict at 
issue); cf. Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited 
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2007) (“Barring any 
evidence to the contrary, courts should restrain themselves from reaching any 
conclusions other than those that the parties, who are perceived to have understood the 
terms of the written agreement and bargained for and negotiated the relationship 
created by the contract in exchange for consideration.”).  But cf. Dunlap v. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 442 (Del. 2005) (observing that Delaware courts have 
“recognized the occasional necessity of implying contract terms to ensure the parties’ 
reasonable expectations are fulfilled”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
BRYANT (DO NOT DELETE) 12/27/2020  9:21 PM 
840 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:815 
Put differently, if parties intended to rely on common law default 
rules, merger agreements would not need MAE clauses at all.  And as 
applied to bring-down conditions, an essential failure standard would 
comport almost identically with those rules.  For example, inaccurate 
representations or warranties made by the seller that relate to the 
buyer’s primary or secondary purposes for contracting, which 
inaccuracies exist at contract execution, could excuse the buyer’s closing 
obligations under the common law doctrine of existing frustration.210  
Again, an approach that interprets MAE clauses as directly mimicking 
common law default rules defeats that clause’s purpose and renders the 
language—and the parties’ stringent negotiations—essentially 
superfluous.   
2.  The Conduct/Intent Standard 
Rather than relying on common law default rules, a new approach 
can be extracted from the pattern seen across Delaware opinions that 
carefully scrutinizes party intent to determine whether the events in 
question constitute an MAE.211  Under this approach, qualitative 
considerations would weigh the seller’s conduct and disclosures against 
the buyer’s conduct and intentions surrounding the MAE declaration.  
The conduct/intent approach would yield a new three-step test for 
whether qualitative elements suggest an MAE.   
This analysis would first consider the specific language chosen by 
the parties to denote an MAE bring-down condition together with the 
context of the agreement.  Where parties disagree as to materiality 
qualifiers or carveout language, the court should view the terms in the 
context of the language finalized elsewhere in the parties’ agreement.212  
 
 210 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 266(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  The ability 
to consider foreseeable events does not negate this comparison because foreseeability 
relates only to post-signing developments.  For inaccuracies existing at the time of 
contract execution, a separate standard is necessary because “one cannot go back in time 
to fix a representation made as of a date in the past” and thus negate the buyer’s MAE 
declaration.  See Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., No. 2018-0673-AGB, 
2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394, at *70 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019). 
 211 See Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *152–66 (analyzing buyer’s conduct 
throughout the transaction); Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 
715, 722 (Del. Ch. 2008) (viewing buyer’s conduct negatively where such conduct 
deviated from the parties’ professed intent); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., No. 20502, 
2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *109–19 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005) (considering conduct by both 
parties which contributed to deal failure); In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig. v. Tyson Foods, 
789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001) (suggesting throughout that the court did not believe, due 
to Tyson’s conduct, that Tyson believed IBP had sustained an MAE). 
 212 Hexion, 965 A.2d at 741 (“It is a maxim of contract law that, given ambiguity 
between potentially conflicting terms, a contract should be read so as not to render any 
term meaningless.”). 
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Next, the court would inquire as to whether the seller materially 
deviated from its represented or warranted condition.213  Expert 
opinions, and the credibility underlying such reports, would receive 
close scrutiny to ensure that the materiality finding reflects the seller’s 
accurate financial and operational status.214  And because the Akorn 
analysis factored post-trial events into its findings, the actual outcome 
of the seller’s deviations or omissions would likely factor into a 
materiality finding.215  Finally, the court would analyze the objective 
reasonableness of the buyer’s belief that the target company had 
sustained an MAE as well as subjective evidence supporting or 
undermining that belief.216  Crucial to this analysis would be evidence 
showing the buyer’s subjective beliefs throughout the transactional 
timeline, including the motivating factors for the MAE declaration and 
any surrounding circumstances which would detract from that 
assertion.217   
The conduct/intent standard avoids the problematic application of 
common law default rules.  The analysis ensures that, under the 
appropriate circumstances, buyers can benefit from their heavily 
negotiated MAE clauses.  Simultaneously, this approach fends off 
buyer’s remorse where the declarations appear pretextual or 
 
 213 A material deviation from a representation or warranty “alter[s] the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available” to a reasonable buyer.  Channel, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394, 
at *42–43 (quoting Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325, at *86).  This standard is analytically 
distinct from the “long-term earnings potential” standard applicable to MAE assertions.  
Id. at *43. 
 214 This is not to suggest that expert reports are not already subjected to high 
scrutiny.  Rather, expert reports can demonstrate whether the party submitting that 
report intended the opinion to accurately reflect the financial and operational 
conditions when the MAE was declared.  See Hexion, 965 A.2d at 727 (holding insolvency 
opinion, prepared in anticipation of litigation, unreliable for actual valuation estimates).  
For a post-Akorn MAE opinion applying this approach, see Channel, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
1394, at *86–94. 
 215 See Channel, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394, at *77–78 (finding buyer’s MAE prediction 
unreasonable where the anticipated events did not occur).  
 216 At least one post-Akorn decision has found no MAE where the buyer’s belief was 
not objectively reasonable in light of the transactional circumstances.  Id. at *85. 
 217 This analysis is distinguishable from a common law implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing analysis.  To invoke the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
a party must demonstrate a gap in the agreement’s express terms.  See, e.g., Vintage 
Rodeo Parent v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., No. 2018-0927-SG, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 87, at *62 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 2019) (“What the Plaintiffs ultimately seek is equitable fairness, which 
is not promised by the implied covenant.”).  Where a contractual provision defines an 
MAE and establishes specific conditions precedent, the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing provides no additional deal protection.  See 3M Co. v. Neology, Inc., No. 
N18C-07-089 AML CCLD, 2019 Del. Super. LEXIS 312, at *29–30 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2019).  
Rather, a conduct analysis mirrors the established inquiry as to the parties’ conformity 
with contractual expectations.  See supra text accompanying note 211.  
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inconsistent with party conduct.  Determining materiality through 
conduct and intent, as well as plain contract language, returns the focus 
to what the parties understood the contract to mean.  That focus should 
be prominent and primary throughout MAE interpretation because, as 
IBP reiterates, effectuating the parties’ intentions is the objective of 
judicial review of private agreements.218 
B.  Eliminate Presumptive Advantages  
A party-neutral standard that expands on Akorn’s qualitative 
analysis could avoid numeric presumptions and also prevent Delaware 
courts from massacring future MAE claims.  Biased interpretation 
standards effectively rewrite contract language where parties set 
intentionally vague terms.219  And granting either party an inherent 
advantage goes against the contractarian theory that Delaware courts 
stringently respect.220   
The solution to MAE interpretation is not to evenly distribute 
interpretation bias, but to eliminate bias altogether.  Rather than 
approaching MAE assertions as presumptively motivated by buyer’s 
remorse, Delaware courts should recognize MAE claims for what they 
are: one party’s assertion of a bargained-for contractual right.221  Such 
recognition demands the abandonment of the seller-friendly policy.  
Simultaneously, future opinions should acknowledge that the numeric 
benchmark outlined in the Akorn opinion, while illustrative of what may 
constitute materiality, cannot itself be dispositive.222  By moving away 
from the seller-friendly policy and expressly disclaiming the percentage 
thresholds, Delaware courts can move toward a genuinely contractarian 
MAE interpretation standard.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Akorn decision shows that Delaware courts are, in fact, capable 
of permitting a buyer to back out after a failed bring-down condition is 
proven likely to cause an MAE.  Though not expressly abandoning the 
seller-friendly policy, this opinion serves as a helpful starting point for 
reevaluating how Delaware courts approach MAE claims.  To better 
reflect the purpose of judicial review, future opinions should cautiously 
 
 218 IBP, 789 A.2d at 55. 
 219 See Hill, supra note 185, at 216. 
 220 See Brooks, supra note 56, at 101–02.  
 221 See Brooks, supra note 56, at 106–07. 
 222 Cf. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (“Any approach that designates 
a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding 
such as materiality, must necessarily be over- or under-inclusive.”). 
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apply Akorn to shift the Delaware MAE standard toward an approach 
which carefully considers whether, as evidenced through conduct and 
intent, the parties would reasonably have expected the development to 
constitute an MAE and waive the buyer’s obligation to close.  That 
conduct/intent approach would ensure that bring-down conditions, and 
failure to comply therewith, grant protection for buyers with justifiable 
remorse.  
